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Abstract. MimbleWimble is a privacy-oriented cryptocurrency technol-
ogy encompassing security and scalability properties that distinguish it
from other protocols of the kind. In this paper we present and briefly dis-
cuss those properties and outline the basis of a model-driven verification
approach to address the certification of the correctness of a particular
implementation of the protocol.
1 Introduction
Cryptocurrency protocols deal with virtual money so they are a valuable target
of highly skilled attackers. Some attacks have already been mounted against
cryptocurrency systems causing irreparable loses of money and credibility (e.g.
[17]). For this reason the cryptocurrency community is seeking for approaches,
methods, techniques and development practices that can reduce the chances of
successful attacks. One such approach is the application of formal methods to
software implementation. In particular, the cryptocurrency community is showing
interest in formal proof and formally certified implementations.
MimbleWimble is a privacy-oriented cryptocurrency technology encompassing
security and scalability properties that distinguish it from other technologies
of the kind. Mimblewimble differs from Bitcoin [14], for instance, in key areas:
there is no concept of address and all the transactions are confidential. In this
(short) paper we outline an approach based on formal software verification aimed
at formally verifying the basic mechanisms of MimbleWimble and (one of) its
implementations [10].
Reasoning about implementations provides the ultimate guarantee that de-
ployed critical systems provide the expected properties. There are however signif-
icant hurdles with this approach. Formally proving non-trivial security properties
of code might be an overwhelming task in terms of the effort required, especially
compared with proving functional correctness. In addition, many implementation
details are orthogonal to the security properties to be established. This implies
that slight changes in the implementation technology might have devastating
consequences as concerns the security of the implementation. Therefore, com-
plementary approaches are needed when non-trivial security properties are at
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
01
68
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
 Ju
l 2
01
9
2stake. In this paper we put forward a model-driven verification approach where
in the first place security issues that pertain to the realm of critical mechanisms
are explored on an idealized model of the system under study. One such model
abstracts away the specifics of any particular implementation and yet provides a
realistic setting. Then verification is performed on more concrete models where
low level mechanisms (such as pointer arithmetic) are specified; and finally the
low level model is proved to be a correct implementation of the idealized model.
Organization of the paper Section 2 provides a very brief description of
the MimbleWimble cryptocurrency protocol. Section 3 describes the building
blocks of a formal idealized model (abstract state machine) of the computational
behaviour of MimbleWimble and Section 4 provides a brief account of the
verification activities we are putting in place in order to verify the protocol and
its implementation. Final remarks are presented in Section 5.
2 The MimbleWimble protocol
Transactions are at the core of the Mimblewimble protocol and they constitute a
derivation of what are known as confidential transactions [13,9].
A confidential transaction allows a sender to encrypt the amount of bitcoins
he wants to send by using blinding factors, which are values chosen by the sender
that are used to encrypt bitcoin amounts in a transaction. In a confidential
transaction only the two parties involved know the amount of bitcoins being
transacted. However, onlookers can still ensure that the transaction is valid by
comparing the number of inputs and outputs; if both are the same, then the
transaction will be considered valid. Such a procedure ensures that no bitcoins
have been created from nothing and is key in preserving the integrity of the
system.
Mimblewimble transactions function in a similar way, except the recipient
of a transaction randomly selects a range of blinding factors provided by the
sender. This blinding factor is then used as proof of ownership by the receiver,
thus, permitting him to spend the bitcoins.
The MimbleWimble protocol aims at providing the following properties [11,10]:
i) verification of zero sums without revealing the actual amounts involved in a
transaction, which implies anonymity; ii) authentication of transaction outputs
without signing the transaction; and iii) good scalability, while preserving security,
by generating blocks of smaller sizes—or better, the size of old blocks can be
reduced thus producing a blockchain whose size does not grow in time as much
as, for instance, Bitcoin’s.
The first two properties are achieved by resting, in the end, on Elliptic Curves
Cryptography (ECC) operations and properties. The third one is a consequence
of the first two.
Verification of transactions If v is the value of a transaction (either input
or output) and H is a point over an elliptic curve, then vH encrypts v because
3it is assumed to be computationally hard to get v from vH if we only know H .
However, if w and z are other values such that v + w = z, then if we only have
the result of encrypting each of them with H we are still able to verify that
equation. Indeed: v+w = z ⇔ vH +wH = zH , due to simple properties of scalar
multiplication over groups. Therefore, with this simple operations, we can check
sums of transactions amounts without knowing the actual amounts.
Nevertheless, say some time ago we have encrypted v with H and now we
see vH , then we know that it is the result of encrypting v. In the context of
blockchain transactions this is a problem because once a block holding vH is
saved in the chain it will reveal all the transactions of v coins. For such problems,
MimbleWimble encrypts v as rG + vH where r is an scalar and G is another
point in H ’s elliptic curve. r is called blinding factor and rG + vH is called
Pedersen Commitment. By using Pedersen Commitments, MimbleWimble allows
for verification of expressions such as v + w = z providing more privacy than
with the standard scheme. In effect, if v + w = z then we chose rv, rw and rz
such that rvG + rwG = rzG and so the expression is recorded as:
v︷ ︸︸ ︷
(rvG + vH )+
w︷ ︸︸ ︷
(rwG + wH ) =
z︷ ︸︸ ︷
rzG + zH
making it possible for every one to verify the transaction without knowing the
true values.
Authentication of transactions Consider that Alice has received v coins and
this was recorded somewhere in the blockchain as rG + vH , where r was chosen
by her to keep it private. Now she wants to transfer these v coins to Bob. As a
consequence, Alice looses v coins and Bob receives the very same amount, which
means that the transaction adds to zero: rG + vH − (rG + vH ) = 0G − 0H .
However, Alice now knows Bob’s blinding factor because it must be the same
chosen by her (so the transaction is balanced). In order to protect Bob from being
stolen by Alice, MimbleWimble allows Bob to add his blinding factor, rB, in such
a way that the transaction is recorded as: (r+rB)G+vH−(rG+vH ) = rBG−0H ,
although now it does not sum zero. However, this excess value is used as part of
an authentication scheme. Indeed, Bob uses rB as a private key to sing, say, the
empty string (). This signed document is attached to the transaction so in the
blockchain we have: 1) Input: I ; 2) Output: O; and 3) Bob’s signed document: S .
In this way, in order to verify the transaction one has to see whether the result
of decrypting S with I −O (in the group generated by G) yields . If I −O does
not yield something of the form rBG − 0H , then  will not be recovered and so
we know there is an attempt to create money from thin air or there is an attempt
to still Bob’s money.
3 Idealized model of a Mimblewimble-based blockchain
The basic elements in our model are transactions, blocks and chains. Each node
in the blockchain maintains a local state. The main components are the local
4copy of the chain and the set of transactions waiting to be validated and added
to a new block. Properties as zero-sum and the absence of double spending in
blocks and chains must be proved for local states.
The blockchain global state can be represented as a mapping from nodes to
local states. For global states, we can state and prove properties of the entire
system like, for instance, correctness of the consensus protocol.
Transactions Given two elliptic curves G and H , we represent transactions as
tuples of the form:
Transaction def= {i : I ∗ , o : O∗ , tk : TxKernel∗}
where X∗ represents the lists of X elements. Each element in i and o is a pair
of the form (r , v) representing the Pedersen commitment in curves G, H . The
transaction kernel tk contains a list of range proofs of the outputs, a list of
transaction excess and the kernel signature σ3. The transaction excess can be
defined as:
ke =
∑
(r′,v′)∈o
r ′.G + v′.H −
∑
(r,v)∈i
r .G + v.H
We said that the transaction is balanced iff
∑
r ′ −∑ r = 0. So, in other words,
the excess is (
∑
v′ −∑ v)H . The kernel signature proves that the transaction
is honestly constructed, in particular that the excess only contains the blinding
factor (no money is being created).
A transaction is valid if: 1) the range proofs of all the outputs are valid; 2) the
kernel signature σ is valid for the excess; and 3) the transaction is balanced.
Blocks and chains Transactions can be merged into a block. We can see a block
as a big transaction with aggregated inputs, outputs and transaction kernels.
A Block is either the genesis block Gen, or a record:
Block def= {i : I ∗ , o : O∗ , k : N, tks : TxKernel∗}
representing the inputs, outputs, the kernel offset and the list of transaction
kernels for the block. The kernel offset k is a blinding factor that needs to be
added back to the kernel excess to verify the commitments sum to zero.
Given a block b = {i, o, k, tks}, we say that a block is valid if the following
equality holds:∑
(r′,v′)∈o
(r ′.G + v′.H )−
∑
(r,v)∈i
(r .G + v.H ) = k +
∑
(ke,s)∈tks
ke
A chain is a non-empty list of blocks:
Chain
def
= Block
∗
3 For simplicity, we leave aside fees in this paper.
5For a chain c and a valid block b, we can define a predicate validates(c, b)
representing the fact that is valid to add b to c. This relation must check, for
example, that all the inputs in b are present as outputs in c, in other words, they
are unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs).
Validating a chain The model formalizes a notion of valid state that captures
several well-formedness conditions. In particular, every block in the blockchain
must be valid. A predicate validChain can be defined for a chain c = [b0, b1, . . . bn]
by checking that: 1) b0 is a valid genesis block, and 2) for every i ∈ {1, . . .n},
validates([b, . . . , bi−], bi).
The axiomatic semantics of the system is modeled by defining a set of actions,
and providing their semantics as state transformers. The behaviour of actions
is specified by a precondition and by a postcondition. This approach is valid
when considering local (nodes) or global (blockchain) states and actions. Different
set of actions, pre and postcondition are defined to cover local or global state
transformations.
Valid states are invariant under execution. The properties in this work are
obtained from valid states of the system.
4 Verification of MimbleWimble
We now proceed to discuss some relevant properties that can be verified on our
model. In addition to some of the properties mentioned in Section 2 we also plan
to include other properties such as those formulated in [15], and various security
properties considered in [8,12,7] later.
Protocol Properties. The zero-sum for valid transactions can be proved using
properties of ECC. This property, and its proof, straightforwardly propagates to
blocks, because adding zero-sum Pedersen commitments is a zero-sum Pedersen
commitment.
An important feature of MimbleWimble is the cut-through process. The
purpose of this property is to erase redundant outputs that are used as inputs
within the same block. Let C be some coins that appear as an output in the block
b. If the same coins appear as an input within the block, then C can be removed
from the list of inputs and outputs after applying the cut-through process. In
this way, eventually, the only data that remain are the block headers, transaction
kernels and unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs). After applying cut-through
to a valid block b is important to ensure that the resulting block b′ is still valid.
We can say that the validity of a block should be invariant with respect to the
cut-through process. Basically, this invariant holds because the matching inputs
and outputs canceled each other in the overall sum.
Privacy and Security Properties. In blockchain systems the notion of privacy is
crucial: sensitive data should not be revealed over the network. In particular, it is
desirable to ensure properties such as confidentiality, anonymity and unlinkability
6of transactions. The first one refers to the property of preventing other participants
from knowing certain information about the transaction, such as the amounts
and addresses of the owners. The second one refers to the property of hiding the
real identity from the one is transacting while the third one refers to the inability
of linking distinct transactions of the same user within the blockchain.
In the Bitcoin network, users interact with the system using public key hashes
achieving a kind of pseudo-anonymity. Every transaction recorded on the ledger
contains the addresses of the sender and receiver and the transaction amount.
That information is publicly available breaking then the confidentiality property.
Furthermore, it fails in providing unlinkability since it is possible to trace the
transactions of the same associated addresses over the ledger.
In the case of Mimblewimble no addresses or public keys are used, there are
only encrypted inputs and outputs. Therefore the communication between the
sender and receiver to share the proof of ownership of the coins must be done off-
chain using a secure channel. Privacy concerns rely on confidential transactions,
cut-through and CoinJoin. The goal of CoinJoin is to combine inputs and outputs
from different transactions into a single unified transaction. Thus, for a third-
party it is difficult to determine which party is making a particular transaction.
It is important to ensure that the resulting transaction satisfies the property of
validity defined in the model.
The security problem of double spending refers to spend a coin more than
once. All the nodes keep track of the UTXO set, so before confirming a block to
the chain, the node checks that the inputs come from it. If we refer to our model,
it is performed in the predicate validates mentioned in Section 3.
Zero-knowledge Proof. The goal of this kind of proofs is to prove that a statment
is true without revealing any information beyond the verification of the statment.
These proofs could require interaction between the prover and the verifier or
not. Genereally, when there is no interaction the validity of the proof relies on
computational assumptions. In MimbleWimble we need to ensure that in every
transaction the transaction amount is positive so that users cannot create coins.
The key here is to prove that property without revealing the amount. As we
defined in the model, the output amounts are hidden in the form of a Pedersen
Commitment and the transaction contains a list of range proofs of the outputs to
prove that the transaction amount is positive. MimbleWimble uses Bulletproofs
[2] to achieve this goal4. In our model, this verification is performed as first step
of the validity of the transaction.
Model-driven verification. MimbleWimble is built on top of a consensus
protocol. In that direction, we have developed a Z specification of a consensus
protocol (see Appendix A). Z specifications in turn can be easily translated into
the {log} language [4]. {log} can be used as both a (prototyping) programming
4 This proof rely on the discrete logarithm assumption and a trusted setup is not
required. The proof size is logarithmic in the amount size and the proof generation
and verification are linear in the bit length of the range.
7language and an automated theorem prover for an expressive fragment of set
theory and set relation algebra. We include an excerpt of the {log} prototype
of a consensus protocol in Appendix B. This {log} prototype can be used as
an executable model where simulations can be run. This allows us to analyze
the behavior of the protocol without having to implement it in a low level
programming language.
We also plan to use {log} to prove some of the properties mentioned above.
However, for complex properties or for properties not expressible in the set theories
supported by {log} we plan to develop a complete and uniform formulation of
several security properties of the protocol using the Coq proof assistant [16]. Coq
has an important set of libraries; for example [1] contains a formalization of
elliptic curves theory, which allows the verification of elliptic curve cryptographic
algorithms. The fact of first having a {log} prototype over which some verification
activities can be carried out without much effort helps in simplifying the process
of writing a detailed Coq specification. This is in acordance with proposals such
as QuickChick whose goal is to decrease the number of failed proof attempts in
Coq by generating counterexamples before a proof is attempted [6].
Applying the program extraction mechanism provided by Coq we shall be
able to derive a certified Haskell prototype of the protocol, which can be used as
a testing oracle and also to conduct further verification activities on correct-by-
construction implementations of the protocol. In particular, both the {log} and
Coq approaches can be used as forms of model-based testing. That is, we can
use either specification to automatically generate test cases with which protocol
implementations can be tested [5,6].
5 Final remarks
We have put forward elements that constitute essential steps towards the de-
velopment of an exhaustive formalization of the MimbleWimble cryptocurrency
protocol, the analysis of its properties and the verification of its implementations.
In particular, the proposed idealized model is key in the described verification
process.
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9A Excerpt of a Z Model of a Consensus Protocol
The following are some snippets of a Z model of a consensus protocol based
on the model developed by Pîrlea and Sergey [15]. For reasons of space we just
reproduce a little part of it.
The time stamps used in the protocol are modeled as natural numbers. Then
we have the type of addresses (Addr), the type of hashes (Hash), the type of
proofs objects (Proof ) and the type of transactions (Tx). Differently from Pîrlea
and Sergey’s model5 we modeled addresses as a given type instead as natural
numbers. In PS the only condition required for these types is that they come
equipped with equality, which is the case in Z.
Time == N
[Addr ,Hash,Proof ,Tx]
The block data structure is a record with three fields: prev, (usually) points to
the parent block; txs, stores the sequence of transactions stored in the block; and
pf is a proof object required to validate the block.
Block
prev : Hash
txs : seqTx
pf : Proof
The local state space of a participating network node is given by three state
variables: as, are the addresses of the peers this node is aware of; bf , is a block
forest (not shown) which records the minted and received blocks; and tp, is a set
of received transactions which eventually will be included in minted blocks.
LocState
as : PAddr
bf : Hash 7→ Block
tp : PTx
The system configuration is represented by two state variables: Delta, which
establishes a mapping between network addresses and the corresponding node
(local) states (in PS this variable is referred to as the global state); and P, a set
of packets (which represent the messages exchanged by nodes).
Conf
Delta : Addr 7→ LocState
P : PPacket
5 From now on we will refer to Pîrlea and Sergey model simply as PS.
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Packets are just tuples of two addresses (origin and destination) and a message.
Packet == Addr ×Addr ×Msg
The model has twelve state transitions divided into two groups: local and global.
Local transitions are those executed by network nodes, while global transitions
promote local transitions to the network level. In turn, the local transitions
are grouped into receiving and internal transitions. Receiving transitions model
the nodes receiving messages from other nodes and, possibly, sending out new
messages; internal transitions model the execution of instructions run by each
node when some local condition is met. Here, we show only the local, receiving
transition named RcvAddr .
RcvAddr
∆LocState
p? : Packet
ps! : PPacket
p?.2 = this
∃ asm : PAddr •
p?.3 = AddrMsg asm
∧ as′ = as ∪ asm
∧ bf ′ = bf
∧ tp′ = tp
∧ ps! = {a : asm \ as • (p?.2, a,ConnectMsg)}∪
{a : as • (p?.2, a,AddrMsg as′)}
As can be seen, RcvAddr receives a packet (p?) and sends out a set of packets (ps!).
The node checks whether or not the packet’s destination address coincides with its
own address. In that case, the node adds the received addresses to its local state
and sends out a set of packets that are either of the form (p?.2, a,ConnectMsg)
or (p?.2, a,AddrMsg as′). The former are packets generated from the received
addresses and sent to the new peers the node now knows, while the latter are
messages telling its already known peers that it has learned of new peers.
B Excerpt of a {log} Prototype of a Consensus Protocol
In this section we show the {log} code corresponding to the Z model presented
in Appendix A. {log} code can be seen as both a formula and a program [4].
Thus, in this case we use the code as a prototype or executable model of the Z
model. The intention is twofold: to show that passing from a Z specification to a
{log} program is rather easy, and to show how a {log} program can be used as a
prototype. The first point is achieved mainly because {log} provides the usual
Boolean conectives and most of the set and relational operators available in Z.
Hence, it is quite natural to encode a Z specification as a {log} program.
Given that {log} is based on Prolog its programs resemble Prolog programs.
The {log} encoding of RcvAddr is the following:
11
rcvAddr(LocState,P,Ps,LocState_) :-
LocState = {[as,As] / Rest} &
P = [_,this, addrMsg(Asm)] &
un(As,Asm,As_) &
diff(Asm,As,D) &
Ps1 = ris(A in D,[],true,[this,A,connectMsg]) &
Ps2 = ris(A in As,[],true,[this,A,addrMsg(As_)]) &
un(Ps1,Ps2,Ps) &
LocState_ = {[as,As_] / Rest}.
As can be seen, rcvAddr is clause receiving the before state (LocState), the
input variable (P), the output variable (Ps) and the after state (LocState_).
As in Prolog, {log} programs are based on unification with the addition of set
unification. In this sense, a statement such as LocState = {[as,As] / Rest}
(set) unifies the parameter received with a set term singling out the state variable
needed in this case (As) and the rest of the variables (Rest). The same is done
with packet P where _ means any value as first component and addrMsg(Asm)
gets the set of addresses received in the packet without introducing an existential
quantifier.
The set comprehensions used in the Z specification are implemented with
{log}’s so-called Restricted Intentional Sets (RIS) [3]. A RIS is interpreted as a
set comprehension where the control variable ranges over a finite set (D and As).
Given rcvAddr we can perform simulations on {log} such as:
S = {[as,{}] / R} &
rcvAddr(S,[_,this,addrMsg({a1,a2})],P1,S1) &
rcvAddr(S1,[_,this,addrMsg({a1,a3})],P2,S2).
in which case {log} returns:
P1 = ris(A in {a1,a2/_N2},[],true,[this,A,connectMsg],true),
S1 = {[as,{a1,a2}]/R},
P2 = {[this,a3,connectMsg],[this,a1,addrMsg({a2,a1,a3})],
[this,a2,addrMsg({a2,a1,a3})] /
ris(A in _N1,[],true,[this,A,connectMsg],true)},
S2 = {[as,{a2,a1,a3}]/R}
Constraint: subset(_N2,{a1,a2}), subset(_N1,{a1,a3}),
a1 nin _N1, a2 nin _N1
That is, {log} binds values for all the free variables in a way that the formula is
satisfied (if it is satisfiable at all). In this way we can trace the execution of the
protocol w.r.t. states and outputs by starting from a given state (e.g. S) and input
values (e.g. [_,this,addrMsg({a1,a2})]), and chaining states throughout the
execution of the state transitions included in the simulation (e.g. S1 and S2).
